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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the role of foreign versus domestic ownership in reducing the debt levels of acquired
ﬁrms in Italy and Spain over the period 2002–2010. Acknowledging that lower debt levels can mitigate
the risk of failure and thus enhance the chances for a positive post-acquisition performance and survival,
we particularly examine the causal effect of foreign and domestic acquisitions on two ﬁrm-level debt
measures: gearing and short-term leverage. To estimate causal relationships, we control for selection bias
by applying propensity score matching techniques. Our results indicate that foreign acquisition leads to a
signiﬁcant and steady reduction in the debt ratios of the target companies. In contrast, the relationship
between domestic acquisition and debt reduction appears to be smaller and statistically less robust.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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In the current paper, we examine the inﬂuence of foreign
ownership on debt reduction of acquisition targets. While the
extant literature is rather restricted to the implications of foreign
ownership on proﬁtability, we focus instead on the changes in debt
ratios of a target company after a takeover deal. Since debt ratios
have long been identiﬁed as predictors of failure (when increased)
(Beaver, 1966; Graham & Rogers, 2002; Leland, 1998), identifying
the role of foreign ownership in reducing these ratios, and hence
increasing the chances of survival of the new entity after the deal, is
adding one vital piece to the post-acquisition performance puzzle.
The impact of foreign ownership on performance has been in
the forefront of the international business and ﬁnance literatures
for several decades. Yet, ﬁndings remain inconclusive. There is an
abundance of evidence supporting the superiority of foreign-
owned ﬁrms over their domestic counterparts (Boardman, Shapiro,$ This paper was developed as part of the SERVICEGAP project, which was funded
by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 7th
Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities, Grant
Agreement no: 244 552. The authors wish to thank Ian Gregory-Smith, Maria Gil
Molto and the participants of seminars at the University of Birmingham, and the
SERVICEGAP meeting in Dublin for useful comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.01.008
0969-5931/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access artic& Vining, 1997; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Gedajlovic, 1993).
From a resource based view, ﬁrms owned by foreign ﬁrms, typically
large ones, can beneﬁt from ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages of the parent
company, – i.e. technological expertise, networking, access to
capital etc. – which can positively inﬂuence ﬁrm performance
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Douma et al., 2006; Dunning, 1998). From an
agency point of view, foreign ﬁrms are assumed to be better
monitored and controlled, presenting an overall more robust
ﬁnancial performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Thomsen &
Pedersen, 2000). Nevertheless, industry and country speciﬁc
factors (Barbosa & Louri, 2005; Globerman, Ries, & Vertinsky,
1994), high agency costs (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) and
institutional factors (Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout,
2009) have been reported to offset the beneﬁts of foreign
ownership.
The rich extant literature on cross-border acquisitions is equally
convoluting. On one hand, several studies on cross-border takeover
deals have found a positive impact of foreign ownership on
performance associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages of the
foreign acquirer (Li, Li, & Wang, 2015; Markides & Ittner, 1994;
Ning, Kuo, Strange, & Wang, 2014). On the other hand, there is
overwhelming evidence suggesting that acquisition deals do not
manage to create shareholder value, but rather destroy it (Agrawal,le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).1
From the above, it is easy to discern that, as long as the literature is
restricted to the direct implications of foreign ownership on
proﬁtability, a consensus regarding the role of foreign ownership
on post-takeover performance cannot be reached. Nevertheless,
with the 7th global Merger Wave2 well under way, it is imperative to
better understand not only the direct but also the indirect
implications of foreign acquisitions on performance. So far we know
that a reduction in debt levels minimizes the risk of failure and thus
enhances the chances for a positive post-acquisition performance
and survival. Meanwhile, foreign ownership has been long
associated with better performance (Boardman et al., 1997; Douma
et al., 2006; Heugens et al., 2009 Douma et al., 2006; Heugens et al.,
2009), and even lower ﬁnancial risk (Fatemi,1984; Michel & Shaked,
1986). Yet, we are still unclear on whether foreign ownership has in
fact a direct impact on the debt levels of acquired companies. To our
knowledge, none of the former studies have explicitly factored in
the impact of foreign ownership on debt reduction.
Our study contributes to the international business literature in
three distinct ways. First, we inform the international business
audience of the changes associated with foreign ownership on debt
levels of acquired ﬁrms after a takeover deal. We particularly
examine the causal effect of acquisitions on two ﬁrm-level debt
ratios: gearing (short and long term debt to shareholders funds
ratio) and short-term leverage (short term debt to total assets
ratio). Second, while most empirical studies have concentrated on
the acquirer’s performance (Haleblian, Devers, Mcnamara, Car-
penter, & Davison, 2009), we offer speciﬁc insights on the impact
for the target company after the deal. The few studies on target
ﬁrms have clearly shown signiﬁcant differences on performance
that cannot be ignored (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). At the same time,
the survival of a target ﬁrm is paramount for both the acquirer (as a
parent company) and the economy in which it operates (Haskel,
Pereira, & Slaughter, 2007; O’Donnell & Blumentritt, 1999;
Rugman, Verbeke, & Yuan, 2011). Third, we compare matching
samples of both domestic and foreign acquired ﬁrms,3 which
allows us to isolate the effect of foreign ownership and measure it
with a higher degree of conﬁdence.
Finally, acknowledging the signiﬁcance of the institutional
context on the ownership-performance/debt relationship (Heu-
gens et al., 2009), speciﬁcally in bank-based economies (Kroszner
& Strahan, 2001), we focus on two of the largest bank-based
economies, namely Italy and Spain. Domestic ﬁrms in the two
countries, being characterized by an overreliance on bank credit
and a restricted ﬁnancing availability, offer an ideal setting for our
study. By achieving a better appreciation of the factors leading to
lower debt ratios for the Italian and Spanish ﬁrms, we open the
ground for new context-speciﬁc theory development with signiﬁ-
cant managerial and policy implications.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses in more
detail how our contribution is related to previous studies.
Speciﬁcally, we bring together two strands of the literature to
inform our discussion: the literature on foreign ownership and
performance and the literature on debt, risk and performance.
Section 3 outlines the empirical model speciﬁcation and describes
the data, whereas Section 4 reports the empirical results and
investigates their robustness. Section 5 provides conclusions and1 Business correspondents in the Financial Times (FT) and other business
magazines are also expressing serious concerns for the increasing record failures of
acquisition deals (i.e. Masoudi, 2014, FT).
2 . . . starting in 2011, as a consequence of the rise of the big emerging countries
(BRICs).
3 Very few past studies have explicitly compared foreign and domestic
acquisitions (see, for example, Arnold and Javorcik, 2009).further implications, and, ﬁnally, Section 6 discusses limitations
and suggests directions for future research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1. Foreign versus domestic ownership and performance
An extensive number of scholars from different strands of the
literature have been involved in deciphering the impact of foreign
ownership on performance. Despite the voluminous studies,
ﬁndings are still inconclusive, with empirical studies depicting
both positive and negative relationships.
From a resource based view, foreign ownership has been early
associated with positive performance, as a result of ownership-
speciﬁc advantages bestowed to foreign owners. Technological
expertise and specialized production processes, superior manage-
ment and marketing capabilities, as well as access to ﬁnancial and
human capital are only some of these key advantages identiﬁed
(Caves,1996; Douma et al., 2006; Dunning,1998). When effectively
deployed in a foreign market, these advantages help their
proprietors exploit host market imperfections, and overcome
transaction costs, the liability of foreignness and other barriers of
internationalization (Barbosa & Louri, 2005; Dunning, 1998; Harris
& Robinson, 2003; Markides & Ittner, 1994). Indeed, several
empirical studies have provided evidence for the superiority of
foreign ﬁrms over their domestic counterparts4 (Boardman et al.,
1997; Caves, 1996; Douma et al., 2006; Gedajlovic, 1993; Heugens
et al., 2009). Meanwhile, foreign ownership has been associated
with higher overall productivity (Harris & Robinson, 2003), and
greater ﬁrm resistance to domestic demand contractions (Varum,
Rocha, & Valente DA Silva, 2014).
Nevertheless, from an agency point of view, foreign corporate
ownership has been associated with both positive and negative
effects: the beneﬁts and costs associated with higher control.
Foreign ownership is known to enhance managerial control and
hence shareholder protection, especially in the presence of
institutional voids (Heugens et al., 2009). By exhibiting higher
concentration of share ownership, corporate foreign owners, such
as large multinationals, can “set and effectively impose control
mechanisms that maximize performance” (Jensen & Meckling,
1976, p. 17), leading to the dominance of foreign- over domesti-
cally-owned companies (Boardman & Vining, 1989; Thomsen &
Pedersen, 2000). Yet, the imposition of high control mechanisms is
also known to increase transaction costs, which, coupled with
tunneling effects and minority shareholder expropriation, can
impose serious negative performance effects (Demsetz & Villa-
longa, 2001; Heugens et al., 2009).
2.1.1. Insights from the acquisition literature
Acknowledging international acquisitions as an important
foreign entry strategy (Dunning, 1998; Li et al., 2015), the cross-
border acquisition literature has contributed signiﬁcantly to the
foreign ownership  performance debate. On one hand, cross-
border deals have long been accredited a higher impact on
performance than domestic ones, mainly due to synergistic gainsA number of empirical studies have corroborated the dominance of foreign
ﬁrms over the domestic ones. For example, Willmore (1986) analyzes a matched
sample of foreign and domestic ﬁrms in Brazil and ﬁnds foreign ﬁrms to have higher
productivity and greater capital intensity. Similarly, Boardman et al. (1997), using
data from the largest 500 non-ﬁnancial Canadian businesses, reveal a clear
performance dominance of multinational ﬁrms over the domestic ones. Even
studies offering contrasting evidence, such as those by Globerman et al. (1994) and
Barbosa and Louri (2005), have to control for size to allow for any variations in their
ﬁndings, suggesting that foreign companies tend to be much larger than their
domestic counterparts, skewing the results in their favor.
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market by the foreign acquirers (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Doukas &
Travlos, 1988; Douma et al., 2006; Li et al., 2015, Markides & Ittner,
1994). To this end, a ﬁrm’s foreign-acquisition announcement can
be viewed by the market as a signal “to transfer or expand a ﬁrm's
resources internationally that will enable the ﬁrm to exploit
uniquely international distortions in capital markets” (Doukas &
Travlos, 1988, p. 1162).
On the other hand, empirical evidence offers a diverse picture. It
is actually a well-known fact that most acquisition deals destroy
rather than create shareholder value (Agrawal et al., 1992; Aw &
Chatterjee, 2004; Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova &
Renneboog, 2008). Similar evidence is also found among the cross-
border acquisition deals (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). The negative-
diversiﬁcation discount hypothesis,5 agency costs, liability of
foreignness, lack of experience in acquisitions, and information
asymmetries are some of the key explanations provided to justify
the negative performance effects (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Doukas &
Travlos, 1988). Additionally, factors such as industry relevance and
unique institutional factors have been found to play an important
role, complicating even more the cross-border acquisition 
performance relationship (Bertrand & Betschinger, 2012; Li et al.,
2015).
It is important to note here that the majority of prior empirical
studies has focused on the acquirer’s performance rather than the
performance of target ﬁrms (Haleblian et al., 2009). Yet, the few
studies that concentrate on target ﬁrms, ﬁnd their returns to be
higher than those achieved by the bidders (acquirers), particularly in
the short-term. While in the short-term acquirers tend to losewealth
from an acquisition deal, the target companies do better  although
lose in the long-term (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Similarly, Hijzen,
Martins, Schank, and Upward (2013), consider changes of ownership
from foreign to domestic and from domestic to foreign in ﬁve
countries; they show that only the latter are associated with a large
positive wage premium, driven by the creation of high-skilled jobs.
Clearly, a consensus is yet to be reached regarding the overall
cross-border acquisition  performance relationship (Martynova &
Renneboog, 2008), particularly since performance has only been
measured in terms of proﬁtability, sales growth, or market power
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Doukas & Travlos, 1988; Markides & Ittner,
1994; Von Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010). However, the few studies that
have explored the impact of cross-border acquisitions on wider
performance measures, such as productivity, operational proﬁtabil-
ity or market value (Boardman et al.,1997; Ninget al., 2014 Ning et al.,
2014) have presented, in most cases, contrasting results. It is
therefore imperative to look beyond proﬁtability-related measures
to fully appreciate the role of foreign ownership on performance.
Early studies in ﬁnance have suggested that foreign ownership can
lead to lower ﬁnancial risk and as such higher performance (Fatemi,
1984; Michel & Shaked, 1986),6 but offer little insights on the
implications of foreign ownershipondebt speciﬁcally. In fact, there is
scarce discourse on the impact of foreign ownership on changes in
debt levels despite the signiﬁcance of this issue for ﬁrm growth and
survival. To this end, we revert for inspiration to the substantial
literature within international business and ﬁnance that has long
explored the negative implications of high debt on the growth and
survival of ﬁrms.5 In efﬁcient market conditions, the announcement of a foreign acquisition
should have a negative signal, denoting the inability of the ﬁrm to further utilize its
resources internally. This, coupled with the high agency costs of monitoring cross
border activities, should have an overall negative effect on performance.
6 Michel and Shaked (1986) report that domestic corporations are signiﬁcantly
less capitalized and have higher systematic and total risks relative to multi-
nationals. Fatemi (1984) claims that foreign owners provide shareholders with risk-
return opportunities, superior to those provided by domestic ﬁrms.2.2. The role of debt on performance and risk
It is well acknowledged that optimal capital structure is the
result of a trade-off between beneﬁts and costs associated with
debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). According to the agency theory,
higher levels of debt, compared to equity, are expected to reduce
agency costs by aligning the interests of managers with those of
shareholders (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Furthermore, debt ﬁnancing can lead to signiﬁcant tax savings,
with positive effects on ﬁrm performance (Graham, 2000).
Nevertheless, high debt also increases the risk of ﬁnancial distress
and raises the direct and indirect costs associated with bankruptcy.
Greater leverage increases the threat of liquidation, causing
personal losses to managers in terms of salaries and reputation
(Grossman & Hart, 1982), whilst increases pressure on managers to
generate the cash ﬂow required to pay interest expenses (Jensen,
1986). At higher levels of leverage, additional debt can result into
precarious increases in agency costs to compensate debt holders
for facing higher ﬁnancial risks (Berger & Di Patti, 2006).
High leverage may further limit the capacity of a ﬁrm to engage
in valuable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977), or even force
them towards riskier decisions. On one hand, stakeholder theory
warns that more leveraged ﬁrms have a tendency to invest in sub-
optimal projects, at least in the long-term, expropriating short-
term wealth from the ﬁrm’s stockholders (Galai & Masulis, 1976;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Titman & Wessels, 1988). On the other
hand, highly-leveraged ﬁrms are driven towards riskier projects
with the expectation of higher potential proﬁts, despite the costs to
their overall credit and default risk (Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). It
is hence not surprising that an increase in leverage has a direct
effect on a ﬁrm’s risk proﬁle and consequently its market rating
(Molina, 2005). A twofold increase in a ﬁrm’s leverage ratio is
construed as an increase in the ﬁrm’s default probability, and its
subsequent downgrade (Graham, 2000).
In conditions of heightened ﬁnancial distress, the leverage 
default relationship is further ampliﬁed. Highly leveraged ﬁrms
tend to be less efﬁcient, which under constraints, can have
detrimental effects on performance. Indeed, Opler and Titman
(1994)  among others  ﬁnd that in conditions of industrial
distress, highly leveraged ﬁrms experience higher losses in market
share, lower levels of stock returns and higher sensitivity in stock
price changes that can hamper their overall performance. As a
result, the probability of bankruptcy among highly leveraged ﬁrms
is doubled when compared to less leveraged ﬁrms (Opler & Titman,
1994). A ﬁrm’s increasing bankruptcy risks impose further costs
(e.g. switching costs) on its stakeholders, fearful of liquidation.
Customers and suppliers are unwilling to invest with a ﬁrm facing
signiﬁcant bankruptcy risks, whereas any reduction in human
capital investment (Jaggia & Thakor, 1994) can lead to negative
impact on total ﬁrm value (Pfeffer, 1994).
2.3. The effect of the institutional environment
The importance of the institutional context on the ownership-
performance relationship has early been established. Different
measurements of leverage, different systems (i.e. bank-based
versus market-based systems,7 tax and bankruptcy laws, oppor-
tunities available to borrowers and investors etc.), as well as
different levels of economic development among countries are
known to condition the underlying relationships and the7 A standard indicator to classify economies into bank-based and market-based is
the ratio of domestic bank credit to market capitalization (Levine, 2002); for
example, a country with a high value of this indicator is considered to be bank-
based.
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For example, Heugens et al. (2009) report that over certain
thresholds of institutional development, ownership concentration
(typical among foreign-owned ﬁrms) is signiﬁcantly more effective
in these cases, foreign-owned ﬁrms tend to dominate their
domestic counterparts.
Nevertheless, despite the importance of the context, extant
research on the foreign ownership  performance relationship has
been rather segmented to large market-based economies, such as
the USA and the UK. However, bank-based economies present
distinctive individualities compared to the market-based ones that
cannot be simply ignored. Bank-based economies are typically
heavily relying on concentrated bank ownership of the debt and
equity capital, and a closely monitored management team.
Consequently, in these economies, banks have a strong voice in
corporate governance, and they are actively involved in any
investment decisions within the country8 (Kroszner & Strahan,
2001), even in the decision of a takeover. Compared to market-
based economies, empirical evidence actually ﬁnds bank-based
systems lacking in efﬁciency at allocating capital, managing risks
and encouraging governance (see Levine, 2002; Holmström &
Tirole, 1993; Hillier, Clacher, Ross, Westerﬁeld, & Jordan, 2011). In
such conditions, the presence of foreign investors  acting as a
market substitute  may be central to the overall market growth.
To this end, we take here a closer look at two of the largest bank-
based economies in the world, Italy and Spain, to gain a better
appreciation of the foreign ownership – debt relationship under
this distinct context.
2.3.1. The individualities of the Italian and Spanish economies
Compared to other large bank-based economies, Italy and Spain
have less developed stock and private equity markets,9 which
results in banks being particularly important for the ﬁnancing of
ﬁrms operating in the two countries. For instance, in 2010, bank
lending to ﬁrms in Italy and Spain was equal to 57 and 86 percent of
GDP, respectively, compared to 36 per cent in Germany (De Bonis,
Pozzolo, & Stacchini, 2012). Italy and Spain also exhibit a poor
performance in terms of productivity growth,10 which can be
explained by the relatively small ﬁrm size in the two countries.
More precisely, Italy and Spain have a much larger share of small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than the USA, the UK,
Germany or France, which tend to be less productive than larger
ﬁrms (Balconi, 2015). Furthermore, unlike large enterprises, which
may turn to the capital markets, SMEs rely mostly on bank loans for
funding, as a result of their organizational features and business
strategies that are rarely publicly disclosed (Kaya, 2014). Hence,
the central role of banks in ﬁrm ﬁnancing and the overwhelming
large share of SMEs in Italy and Spain make domestic ﬁrms in the
two countries particularly vulnerable to macro-economic shocks
and changes in bank credit.8 In Germany for example, CEOs are forbidden from serving on their supervisory
boards; hence communication with shareholders is achieved through a board
controlled by bankers (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).
9 As stated by De Bonis et al. (2012), the underdevelopment of the ﬁnancial
markets in Italy can be attributed to the country’s historical legacy and a number of
other factors, such as the dominance of family controlling ﬁrms, which tend to keep
outside shareholders away, the prevalence of the public pension scheme, which
leaves little room for institutional investors and thus reduces the potential demand
for shares, and the legal system, which has been blamed for failing to protect
minority shareholders and small investors.
10 According to Balconi (2015), total factor productivity has fallen in Italy over the
past 20 years and increased only marginally in Spain, compared to the cumulative
growth of about 10% in France and Germany, and 8%, on average, in the Eurozone.The above observations are conﬁrmed when looking at debt
developments over the period 2000–2010. As shown in Fig.1, of the
ﬁve largest Eurozone countries, the debt to ﬁnancial assets ratios of
non-ﬁnancial corporations increased mostly in Italy and Spain. In
all countries, non-ﬁnancial corporations’ debt declined in 2009 
though to a lesser extent in Italy and Spain. As reported by
European Central Bank (ECB) (2012), this can be explained by debt
deleveraging: as a reaction to changing conditions in bank credit
after the crisis, ﬁrms may have increased their efforts to deleverage
in order to secure or improve their creditworthiness, and these
efforts may have been stronger for large ﬁrms than for SMEs
(which dominate the Italian and Spanish economies) due to wider
ﬁnancing options.
2.4. Hypotheses development
Prior literature has established the existence of a non-
monotonic relationship between leverage and performance;
higher levels of leverage may reduce the value of the ﬁrm and
negatively impact its performance. However, the relationship
between leverage and ownership, particularly foreign ownership,
remains rather unclear.
In line with agency theory, foreign ownership  placing a
particular emphasis on managerial control and shareholder
protection (Heugens et al., 2009)  is expected to be associated
with lower levels of debt. Foreign-owned ﬁrms, while enjoying
greater availability and stability of internal funds, will be inclined
to reduce their dependence on short-term borrowing and long-
term debt, minimizing as such their bankruptcy risks (Graham &
Rogers, 2002; Grossman & Hart, 1982). The high uncertainty and
dangers bestowed to the target’s survival by the increased levels of
debts would outweigh any tax beneﬁts from utilizing external
funding to support their operations.
Meanwhile, in institutional settings where managerial freedom
can be hampered, foreign owners will be further inclined to take
over managerial control and minimize any external inﬂuences on
their afﬁliates’ capital structure; consequently, a reduction in their
debt levels is to be expected. Prior literature exploring the behavior
and capital structure of subsidiary companies indeed reveals that
parent companies alter signiﬁcantly the overall debt level and
composition of their subsidiaries when faced with uncertain
political environments and/or very diverse institutional settings. In
fact, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) reported that in countries with
weaker creditor rights or shallow capital markets, parent compa-
nies tend to reduce the external debt levels of their subsidiaries
even up to three quarters, replacing them with internal funds
instead.
In sum, we expect that ﬁrms in bank-based economies acquired
by foreign investors will present lower levels of gearing and short-
term leverage compared to ﬁrms acquired by domestic investors.
Considering the individualities of domestic ﬁrms in Italy and Spain,
and speciﬁcally their overreliance on bank credit and restricted
ﬁnancing availability (resulting from underdeveloped private
equity markets and their small size), we expect that the impact
of foreign acquisitions on debt ratios will be highly pronounced in
these settings, whereas the same motivation would not exist
among the domestically-owned companies. In other words, we
propose that:
Hypothesis 1. Italian and Spanish ﬁrms acquired by foreign
investors will present a signiﬁcant reduction in short-term
leverage ratios after the acquisition deal compared to ﬁrms
acquired by domestic investors.
Hypothesis 2. Italian and Spanish ﬁrms acquired by foreign
investors will present a signiﬁcant reduction in gearing ratios
Fig. 1. Debt to ﬁnancial assets ratio of non-ﬁnancial corporations in euro countries.
Sources: ECB and Eurostat
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domestic investors.
3. Research design
In this section we present the empirical methodology, data
sources, and descriptive statistics relating to acquisitions in Italy
and Spain and to the main variables that we use.
3.1. Data sources
We base our analysis on ﬁnancial account data (unconsolidated)
extracted from the Amadeus data set for ﬁrms in Italy and Spain for
the period between 2002 and 2010. We limit our sample to ﬁrms
that are classiﬁed as private ﬁrms and that operate in manufactur-
ing and services industries. We consider the following as private
ﬁrms: joint stock companies, limited liability companies, limited
liability consortium, one-person company with limited liability,
and one person joint stock company. The vast majority of ﬁrms in
the dataset fall within the deﬁnition of private ﬁrms.11
Since we employ lagged values in our empirical analysis, ﬁrms
must have data on all the variables of interest for at least two years
to be included in our sample.12 Financial institutions and insurance
companies are excluded from the analysis due to compatibility
issues with the format of ﬁnancial accounts. Information on
acquisitions is retrieved from the Zephyr database and matched to
Amadeus data using ﬁrm identiﬁers of acquired ﬁrms.13 This11 In Italy 94.23% are considered private and in Spain 99.5%. Within the subsample
of private ﬁrms, the vast majority consists of limited liability companies (72% in Italy
and 76% in Spain).
12 More precisely, we limit our data to ﬁrms that have at least two years of data for
scale, age, productivity and capital to labor ratio (see Section 3.2 for variable
deﬁnitions). Furthermore, propensity score estimations and matching results are
based on samples with at least two years of data of either short-term leverage or
gearing, depending on which one is used as the outcome variable. Note that we use
linear interpolation to impute a small proportion of missing values in these
variables.
13 The availability of acquisition deals in Zephyr at the time of extraction was
relatively lower in 2010 (see Table 1). However, excluding the year 2010 does not
change our results.matching process allows us to identify Italian and Spanish ﬁrms
that were acquired during the period of study, as well as the
nationality of the acquiring ﬁrm.
The extracted (monetary) variables for manufacturing ﬁrms are
deﬂated using industry producer price indices at the 2-digit NACE
code level, whereas those for services ﬁrms are deﬂated using the
GDP deﬂator with base year 2005. Data on price indices and
employment size classes at the country-industry level are
collected from Eurostat. The ﬁnal sample is an unbalanced panel
with around 120000 ﬁrms per year for each country.
3.2. Empirical methodology
The key objective of our empirical analysis is to evaluate the
causal effect of both foreign and domestic acquisition on ﬁrms’
debt ratios. To control for endogenous factors affecting the
acquisition decision process,14 we follow recent empirical work
on international investment and foreign ownership (Alfaro & Chen,
2012; Arnold & Javorcik, 2009) and compute the acquisition effect
using propensity score matching, as suggested by Heckman,
Ichimura, & Todd (1997). Formally, the effect of acquisition in a
given time period can be expressed as:
E Y1  Y0ð ÞjAcq ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ E Y1jAcq ¼ 1ð Þ  E Y0jAcq ¼ 1ð Þ ð1Þ
where Y denotes the outcome of interest and the subscript of Y
represents the hypothetical circumstances under which the
outcome is evaluated, taking the value one for foreign (domestic)
acquisition and zero for non-acquisition. In particular, we focus on
two outcome variables; namely short-term leverage (ratio of short
term debt to total assets) and gearing (short and long term debt to
shareholders funds ratio). In other words, Eq. (1) represents the
difference between the outcome measure for an acquired ﬁrm and
the analogous measure for the same ﬁrm had it not been acquired.
The latter, however, is an unobserved counterfactual, and hence we
need to construct it using the matching procedure; that is, by
identifying a non-acquired match with similar observable14 Such as self-selection of large and more productive ﬁrms (Helpman et al., 2004)
and/or “cherry-picking" of the best performing ones (Harris and Robinson, 2003).
16 In the ﬁve-nearest neighbors matching, the counterfactual outcome is made up
of the average of the ﬁve control group observations closest in their propensity
806 V. Bamiatzi et al. / International Business Review 26 (2017) 801–815characteristics for each acquired ﬁrm. The underlying assumption
for the validity of this approach is that, conditional on observable
characteristics, the treated (acquired ﬁrms) and the matched non-
treated (non-acquired domestically-owned ﬁrms) would perform
similarly under the same circumstances. To this end, we can re-
write Eq. (1) as:
E Y1jAcq ¼ 1; Xð Þ  E Y10jAcq ¼ 0; Xð Þ½ 
 E Y01jAcq ¼ 1; Xð Þ  E Y10jAcq ¼ 0; Xð Þ½  ð2Þ
where the ﬁrst term captures the causal effect of acquisition (the
difference between the outcome of acquired ﬁrms and a carefully
selected group of non-acquired domestically-owned ﬁrms with
similar observable characteristics) and the second term captures
the selection bias (the difference between the outcome of acquired
ﬁrms, under the hypothetical circumstances that they had not been
acquired, and the outcome of non-acquired domestically-owned
ﬁrms). X is a vector of observable characteristics. Our aim is to
minimize the selection bias by applying propensity score matching
techniques and thus estimate the causal effect of acquisition as the
difference in the sample average of the outcome for treated and
non-treated ﬁrms.
As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), conditioning on all
variables in the treatment model is equivalent to conditioning on
the propensity score (the predicted probability of treatment),
which in our case is the conditional probability of acquisition given
ﬁrm characteristics and past ﬁrm performance. We thus proceed in
two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the propensity score,
separately for each country, using the following probit model:
0Acquisition0inry ¼ F bZinry1 þ ln þ hr þ cy þ e
n o
ð3Þ
where ‘Acquisition’ is a dummy variable that equals one in the yearof
a foreign (domestic) acquisition, and zero if the ﬁrm is not foreign-
owned or a multinational and has not been acquired during the
sampled period; Ownership is captured by any ownership stake over
a threshold of 50% of total shareholding; F denotes the cumulative
distribution function of a standard normally distributed random
variable; Z is a vector of control variables, expressed in natural
logarithms and lagged by one year to account for pre-acquisition
characteristics; i, n, r, y index ﬁrm, industry (at 2-digit NACE code
level), region (at NUTS 2 code level), and time, respectively. We
follow the existing literature on acquisitions and include the
following control variables in vector Z:
Productivity: measured as turnover per employee. Turnover
corresponds to total operating revenues measured as net sales plus
stock variations and other operating revenues.
Scale: measured by the number of employees.
Age: measured by the number of years since establishment.
Capital to labor ratio (K/L): measured as tangible assets by
employee.
We also include in vector Z the outcome variable (short-term
leverage or gearing) and its squared term:15
Short-term leverage (LeverageST): measured as the ratio of short
term debt to total assets, where total assets is the sum of current
assets and ﬁxed assets and short term debt corresponds to the sum of
short term ﬁnancial debts to credit institutions (loans and credits)
and part of long term ﬁnancial debts payable within the year.
Gearing: measured as the ratio of short and long term debt to
shareholders funds.15 We estimate two versions of Eq. (3), one where gearing and its squared term are
included as controls and one where short term leverage and its squared term are
included as controls. The ﬁrst version is the basis for the matching procedure where
gearing is the outcome under consideration, while the second version is the basis
for the matching procedure where short-term leverage is the outcome variable.The addition of the outcome variable and its square term among
the control variables in Eq. (3) ensures that matches assigned on
the propensity score will be homogeneous in terms of their
previous debt levels. To capture unobserved heterogeneity, we also
include industry (ln), region (hr) and year (cy) ﬁxed effects. Finally,
to ensure that the sample is representative of the relevant
population of ﬁrms in each industry, all regressions are weighted
by size classes at the industry level. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms are
divided in ﬁve size classes based on the median number of
employees; with categories being: less than 10, between 10 and 19,
between 20 and 49, between 50 and 249 and 250 or more (Eurostat
size-class breakdown).
In the second stage, we employ ﬁve-nearest neighbors
matching16 and compare the outcome variables within observa-
tions matched by the propensity score. More precisely, each
treated ﬁrm t is matched with Nct ¼ 5 controls that are closest in
terms of the propensity score. The outcome variable of each of the
controls c matched to treated ﬁrm t is weighted by Wtc ¼ 1=Nct . We
also impose the restriction that the matched control observations
must come from the same industry, size class, and productivity
group17 as the acquired ﬁrm. This eliminates the probability that
different levels of capital structure across industry, size, and
productivity combinations exert inﬂuence on our estimated
results. To examine whether the model for the propensity score
is misspeciﬁed, we perform tests of the balancing property; that is,
we test the signiﬁcance of differences between acquired and
matched ﬁrms for each variable entering the propensity score
estimation. Formally, the average treatment effect (‘ATT’) of
acquisition in the year of acquisition (when j = 0) and the
subsequent three years (when j = 1–3) is calculated as:
ATTj ¼
1
N
XN
1
ðlnYtacquisitionyearþjÞ 
1
N
XN
1
ðWclnYcacquisitionyearþjÞ j
¼ 0; 1; 2; 3 ð4Þ
where Wc ¼
X
t
Wtc.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the number of foreign and domestic
acquisitions and the number of pre-matched control observations
by country and year. It shows a steady increase of domestic and
foreign acquisitions in both countries up to 2008, followed by a
drop of acquisitions in 2009. Table 1 also shows a larger number of
domestic acquisitions compared to foreign acquisitions, in both
countries and in all years.
Table 2 lists the top ten home countries of foreign acquirers,
separately for Italy and Spain. These top 10 countries account for
almost 80% of all acquisition deals. As we can see from this table,
most acquirers originate from other European countries. More
precisely, 70% of foreign acquisitions of Spanish ﬁrms and 60% of
foreign acquisitions of Italian ﬁrms are made by acquirers
originating from other European economies. Outside Europe,
ﬁrms from the USA hold a signiﬁcant share of the foreign
acquisitions (18% in the case of Italy, and 13% in the case ofscore to the treated observation. To reduce the likelihood of poor matches, the
matching is carried out with replacement (each control can serve as the
counterfactual for more than one treated observation) using a 0.005 caliper (the
difference in the propensity score between treated and control observations). In
addition, we exclude observations outside the common support, bound by the
lowest propensity score of a treated observation and the highest propensity score of
a matched control observation.
17 We divide ﬁrms into ﬁve productivity groups based on the median value of the
turnover per employee.
Table 2
Top 10 countries of foreign acquirers.
Country Italy Spain
Number of Acquisitions % of Total Country Number of Acquisitions % of Total
United States 36 18.18 France 38 15.83
Germany 25 12.63 United Kingdom 36 15.00
France 22 11.11 United States 31 12.92
United Kingdom 19 9.60 Germany 19 7.92
Spain 11 5.56 Italy 19 7.92
Switzerland 9 4.55 Portugal 15 6.25
Belgium 8 4.04 Belgium 11 4.58
Sweden 8 4.04 Sweden 10 4.17
India 6 3.03 Netherlands 7 2.92
Netherlands 6 3.03 Japan 5 2.08
Table 1
Counts of acquisitions and controls by year.
Year Italy Spain
Foreign
Acquisitions
Domestic
Acquisitions
Controls Foreign
Acquisitions
Domestic
Acquisitions
Controls
2002 11 34 108601 13 33 108002
2003 11 26 112744 13 54 113003
2004 14 35 117137 22 34 117628
2005 30 36 121274 33 39 121687
2006 31 39 124893 26 71 124929
2007 35 51 127069 45 90 126908
2008 41 62 127489 62 133 127568
2009 19 37 127491 21 90 127568
2010 6 9 127491 6 20 127568
Total 198 329 1094189 241 564 1094861
20 Due to data limitations, this bilateral comparison is based on a sub-sample of
the acquisition cases used in the paper. Therefore, the corresponding results are not
reported in the paper but are available upon request.
21 We estimate the probability of exit using a complementary log-log model
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economies, with India being the only developing country in the top
10 of home countries for acquisitions made in Italy.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables (i.e.
the variables included in our propensity score regressions), while
distinguishing between three categories of ﬁrms; ﬁrms acquired by
foreign companies, ﬁrms acquired by domestic companies, and
domestic non-acquired ﬁrms. We can discern here that, on
average,18 target ﬁrms are more productive, larger and older than
non-acquired domestic ﬁrms; they are also less capital intensive
and have a lower gearing ratio but a higher short-term leverage
ratio in comparison to domestic non-acquired ﬁrms. When
comparing between foreign and domestic acquisitions, we can
see that ﬁrms acquired by foreign companies are larger, more
productive, less capital intensive and have a lower gearing ratio
than ﬁrms acquired by domestic investors.19
Additional bilateral comparative analysis of the same variables
for target ﬁrms and their acquirers shows that the acquiring
companies in our sample  particularly the foreign ones  are
very robust and in a much better ﬁnancial condition than the
targets prior to the acquisition event. More precisely, we ﬁnd that
acquiring ﬁrms are more productive, larger, older and more
capital intensive than the acquired (target) ﬁrms, and these
differences are more pronounced when acquirers are foreign. We
also ﬁnd that acquirers in general and foreign acquirers in
particular are in a better shape in terms of capital structure than
the targets; that is, ﬁrms acquired by foreign investors exhibit18 . . . and without accounting for other ﬁrm-characteristics and industry/region
heterogeneities.
19 Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix present the distribution of ﬁrms by industry
and by size class.signiﬁcantly higher (pre-acquisition) debt ratios compared to
these investors.20
We now turn to discuss some statistical evidence of the
relevance of debt for ﬁrms’ chances of survival. We perform a
simple empirical exercise where we estimate the probability of exit
of ﬁrm i in year t and investigate the link between our two debt
ratios (‘Gearing’ and ‘Short-term Leverage’) and the probability of
exit.21 We consider that a ﬁrm has exited the market if, for two
consecutive years, it has not reported data for key variables, like
employment, turnover or sales. The results, reported in Table 4,
show a strong and positive relationship between the levels of debt
and the probability of exit. More precisely, the coefﬁcient on the
debt ratio is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both Italy and
Spain during the sampled period, and this effect persists regardless
of the proxy used for debt. A more sophisticated empirical analysis
is, of course, needed to draw robust econometric inferences about
the impact of debt reduction on ﬁrms’ survival chances.
Nevertheless, we feel that this exercise is descriptively consistent
with our theoretical framework where lower debt levels can
mitigate the risk of failure, and outlines the importance of studying
the factors that could potentially reduce a ﬁrm’s debt ratios.(cloglog) which is a discrete-time version of the Cox proportional hazard model
(Görg and Spaliara, 2014). As right-hand-side variables, we use a measure of ﬁrm-
level debt (‘Gearing’ and ‘Short-term Leverage’), scale and its squared term, age and
its squared term, productivity, capital intensity and the ratio of intangible assets to
total employment. All right-hand-side variables are expressed in natural logarithm
and lagged by two years (due to the deﬁnition used for the exit variable). We also
include a full set of ﬁxed effects at the year, industry and regional levels. Full results
are available upon request.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the main variables.
Italy Spain
Foreign Acquisitions Domestic Acquisitions Controls Foreign Acquisitions Domestic Acquisitions Controls
Productivity 635.39 455.22 477.53 380.32 313.67 285.22
(1356.44) (1245.99) (1070.47) (890.92) (633.15) (557.60)
Scale 175.46 147.11 26.65 141.10 100.26 26.04
(386.46) (284.66) (86.31) (239.75) (228.76) (79.63)
Age 20.81 20.09 16.70 21.03 18.74 14.10
(15.84) (14.34) (12.96) (15.22) (14.68) (10.47)
K/L 90.86 98.19 121.04 96.28 114.82 180.93
(451.08) (448.59) (677.36) (488.58) (609.45) (707.70)
Gearing 150.92 169.44 198.29 95.37 125.91 103.43
(195.11) (195.4) (225.53) (143.70) (179.49) (164.47)
LeverageST 12.34 12.89 11.40 7.57 7.29 3.20
(17.28) (17.84) (16.09) (11.39) (12.36) (9.08)
Note: Columns report mean values. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 4
Debt ratios and the probability of exit.
Italy Spain
Gearing LeverageST Gearing LeverageST
ln(Debt ratio) 0.018** 0.006* 0.051*** 0.013**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Industry, time, region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 240412 260065 460080 511111
Log Pseudo-likelihood 1056995.6 1149835.7 1156749.1 1274303.3
Wald chi2 12295.77 14225.51 7272.70 9802.37
prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Exit is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm has two consecutive years of missing data for key variables. Explanatory variables lagged by two years. Columns
report estimated coefﬁcients. Robust p-values in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by country-industry sampling weights. ***,**,* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% conﬁdence level, respectively.
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4.1. Determinants of foreign and domestic acquisition
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of Eq. (3) for each
country, exploring some of the most prevalent factors inﬂuencing
the decision of a foreign or domestic investor to acquire a ﬁrm in
Italy or Spain.
As a ﬁrst point, we can notice that, as expected, productive ﬁrms
are more attractive to foreign acquirers than to domestic acquirers:
the estimated coefﬁcient on ‘Productivity’ appears to be positive
and statistically signiﬁcant only in the equations estimating the
probability of foreign acquisition. Past studies have already
suggested that foreign investors tend to prefer well-performing
ﬁrms to invest in (Harris & Robinson, 2003). On the contrary,
domestic investors who have better knowledge of the local market,
customers, and business networks, rely less heavily on observable
information (i.e. productivity) to select their potential targets.22
Furthermore, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between acquisition and size (measured in terms of
the number of employees) for both countries, and a negative
relationship between acquisition and age  although it is
statistically signiﬁcant only in the case of Italy. These ﬁndings
denote that larger and younger ﬁrms are more likely to be acquired.
On one hand, large, established ﬁrms, having considerable market
experience and assets to offer, can be seen as more reliable22 Even though ﬁrms acquired by foreign investors are more productive than those
acquired by domestic investors, there is still a large productivity gap between
targets and their foreign acquirers. This observation, however, is based on a
comparative analysis of targets and acquiring ﬁrms that only covers a sub-sample of
acquisition cases (see also footnote 20).investment options, particularly in less efﬁcient markets, like Italy
and Spain (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Barbosa & Louri, 2005).
On the other hand, younger ﬁrms can potentially offer higher
growth opportunities for their acquirers, and are thus manage to
offset the liabilities of experience and size.
Capital intensity is also found to signiﬁcantly affect acquisitive-
ness, as also shown in the studies of Shapiro (1980) and Gedajlovic
(1993). Yet, the impact of capital intensity is different across the
two countries: foreign acquirers of Italian ﬁrms tend to favor
higher capital to labor ratios, whereas those of Spanish ﬁrms tend
to favor lower capital to labor ratios. Finally, acquisitiveness is
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by industry, year and region speciﬁc effects
(coefﬁcients not reported).
It is noteworthy that in the case of Italy prior debt levels do not
seem to be a determinant factor of acquisitions, foreign or
domestic. Nevertheless, Spain appears to be a different case
altogether; we do ﬁnd that in Spain higher levels of short-term
leverage do increase the probability of foreign acquisitions, while
reducing the probability of domestic acquisitions.
4.2. The impact of acquisitions on the debt ratios of acquired ﬁrms
The predicted probabilities (or propensity scores) of acquisi-
tion, calculated using the estimates presented in Table 5, form the
basis of the matching procedure. We thus proceed by considering
the results from the ﬁve-nearest neighbors matching.
Panel (a) of Table 6 shows the ATT of foreign acquisition on
‘Gearing’. The evidence obtained suggests that foreign acquisition
leads to a signiﬁcant and steady reduction in the long term debt
ratio: while the treated and control groups start with very similar
levels of ‘Gearing’ in the pre-acquisition period, the former exhibit
lower levels of debt in the subsequent years. Speciﬁcally, during
Table 5
Propensity score estimation.
Italy Spain
Foreign Acquisition Domestic Acquisition Foreign Acquisition Domestic Acquisition
Control for Gearing
ln(Productivity) 0.276*** 0.004 0.253** 0.022
(0.045) (0.111) (0.103) (0.052)
ln(Scale) 0.325*** 0.221*** 0.255*** 0.274***
(0.025) (0.063) (0.055) (0.030)
ln(Age) 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.074 0.012
(0.018) (0.014) (0.090) (0.015)
ln(K/L) 0.067** 0.028 0.114* 0.071*
(0.027) (0.032) (0.060) (0.036)
ln(Gearing) 0.258 0.320* 0.010 0.005
(0.241) (0.183) (0.015) (0.010)
ln(Gearing)2 0.032 0.039* 0.012*** 0.003
(0.028) (0.023) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 12.412*** 5.861*** 8.591*** 4.458***
(1.094) (1.452) (1.593) (0.723)
Industry, time, region dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 573171 636119 607160 694528
Pseudo-R2 0.231 0.182 0.306 0.164
Control for LeverageST
ln(Productivity) 0.267*** 0.012 0.208** 0.046
(0.044) (0.096) (0.101) (0.046)
ln(Scale) 0.344*** 0.222*** 0.248*** 0.237***
(0.020) (0.061) (0.056) (0.039)
ln(Age) 0.038** 0.046*** 0.112 0.030
(0.016) (0.013) (0.080) (0.020)
ln(K/L) 0.064*** 0.026 0.089* 0.044
(0.024) (0.03) (0.049) (0.034)
ln(LeverageST) 0.019 0.018 0.042*** 0.064*
(0.026) (0.018) (0.016) (0.036)
ln(LeverageST)2 0.003 0.001 0.005** 0.014**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
Constant 9.230*** 5.194*** 8.417*** 4.462***
(0.757) (1.320) (1.501) (0.727)
Industry, time, region dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 640313 697837 715897 791181
Pseudo-R2 0.227 0.179 0.271 0.185
Note: Foreign (domestic) acquisition is a dummy variable that equals one in the year of a foreign (domestic) acquisition. Explanatory variables lagged by one year. Columns
report estimated coefﬁcients. Robust p-values in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by country-industry sampling weights. ***,**,* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% conﬁdence level, respectively.
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have 49% (40%) lower gearing ratio compared to their matched
control observations. The reduction in the ‘Gearing’ ratio increases
to 62% (54%) in the ﬁrst year following the acquisition, reaches its
peak at 67% (81%) in the second year, and declines moderately to
57% (78%) in the third year.23 The relatively small impact of foreign
acquisition in Year 0 suggests the presence of restructuring costs
that increase the gearing ratio in the year of completion.
Panel (b) of Table 6 shows the ATT of domestic acquisition on
‘Gearing’. The results indicate that, when ﬁrms are acquired by
domestic investors, changes to the long-term debt ratio are smaller
and statistically less robust. More precisely, for Italian ﬁrms, the
ATT of domestic acquisition is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in all four years, but appears to be substantially lower in absolute
value compared to that of foreign acquisition. For instance, in the
three post-acquisition years, reduction in the gearing ratio of
acquired ﬁrms amounts to 24%-32% compared to the control group.
However, for Spanish ﬁrms, the ATT of domestic acquisition is
positive (acquired ﬁrms have higher gearing ratio than their non-
acquired local matches) and marginally statistically signiﬁcant in
the year of completion, but fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance in23 Since the ATT is calculated for the log of the gearing ratio, the reported
percentages are obtained by taking the exponential of the ATT and subtracting one.the three years thereafter. Formal paired t-tests between acquired
and matched control ﬁrms fail to reject the balancing hypothesis
for all variables entering the propensity score estimation,
conﬁrming that our matching procedure has grouped together
homogeneous ﬁrms (see Table A3 in the Appendix A).
The decrease in debt associated with foreign acquisition is
veriﬁed when we use ‘LeverageST’ as the outcome variable (see
panel (c) of Table 6). The results indicate that foreign-acquired
ﬁrms exhibit on average lower short-term debt ratios than their
matched control observations: the reduction in ‘LeverageST’ of
treated ﬁrms is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant,
starting from 60% and 24% in the acquisition year (for Italy and
Spain respectively) and reaching a peak at 89% and 84% in the
second year after acquisition. In contrast, the effect of domestic
acquisition on ‘LeverageST’ is either small or statistically insigniﬁ-
cant or of the opposite sign (see panel (d) of Table 6). For instance,
in the case of Spain, we detect a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
rise in short term indebtedness during the completion year and the
two post-acquisition years.
The stronger impact of foreign acquisition, compared to domestic
acquisition, on the debt levels of the target ﬁrms is conﬁrmed when
we carry out a test of the hypothesis that the ATTs for the two groups
are statistically the same (see Table 7). Speciﬁcally, the results of this
test suggest that, during the completion year in Spain and the three
post-acquisition years in both Italy and Spain, the reduction in
Table 6
The impact of acquisitions on acquired ﬁrms’ debt ratios.
Panel (a): Foreign acquisition/Gearing
Year Italy Spain
ATT N ATT N
0 0.683*** (0.170) 137 0.516* (0.270) 155
1 0.980*** (0.226) 123 0.767** (0.308) 135
2 1.121*** (0.246) 110 1.644*** (0.341) 110
3 0.855*** (0.240) 84 1.525*** (0.425) 76
Panel (b): Domestic acquisition/Gearing
Year Italy Spain
ATT N ATT N
0 0.552*** (0.120) 208 0.284* (0.171) 323
1 0.274** (0.113) 183 0.224 (0.190) 281
2 0.268** (0.106) 151 0.142 (0.247) 208
3 0.393** (0.198) 112 0.348 (0.329) 136
Panel (c): Foreign acquisition/LeverageST
Year Italy Spain
ATT N ATT N
0 0.904** (0.398) 147 0.269 (0.309) 168
1 1.743*** (0.485) 123 0.940*** (0.303) 139
2 2.199*** (0.546) 99 1.857*** (0.430) 97
3 1.814** (0.747) 75 1.720*** (0.574) 62
Panel (d): Domestic acquisition/LeverageST
Year Italy Spain
ATT N ATT N
0 0.467 (0.345) 219 0.939*** (0.199) 391
1 0.423 (0.339) 177 1.192*** (0.269) 300
2 0.418 (0.442) 134 0.676** (0.335) 197
3 0.266 (0.484) 94 0.611 (0.406) 135
Note: ﬁve-nearest neighbor matching. ATT denotes average treatment effect on the
treated. N denotes the number of matched targets. Bootstrap standard errors in
parenthesis. ***,**,* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence level,
respectively.
Table 8
The impact of acquisitions on acquired ﬁrms’ debt ratios; high-income OECD
countries.
Panel (a): Foreign acquisition from high-income OECD countries/Gearing
Year Italy Spain
ATT N ATT N
0 0.802*** (0.204) 118 0.410 (0.288) 130
1 1.028*** (0.200) 105 0.714** (0.351) 112
2 1.196*** (0.236) 94 1.740*** (0.451) 94
3 0.854*** (0.262) 73 1.718*** (0.557) 63
Table 7
Test the equality of the ATTs between foreign and domestic acquisitions.
Gearing
Year Italy Spain
Diff in ATT N Diff in ATT N
0 0.131 (0.208) 345 0.800*** (0.320) 478
1 0.706*** (0.253) 306 0.991*** (0.362) 416
2 0.853*** (0.268) 261 1.502*** (0.421) 318
3 0.462* (0.311) 196 1.177** (0.537) 212
LeverageST
Year Italy Spain
Diff in ATT N Diff in ATT N
0 0.437 (0.527) 366 1.208*** (0.368) 559
1 1.320** (0.592) 300 2.132*** (0.405) 439
2 1.781*** (0.703) 233 2.533*** (0.545) 294
3 1.548** (0.890) 169 1.109* (0.703) 197
Note: Reports the results of a one-sided test (standard errors in parenthesis), where
H0: the difference in the ATT between foreign and domestic matched targets is
equal to zero, and H1: the difference in the ATT between the two groups is negative.
N denotes the combined number of matched targets. ***,**,* Indicates rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence level, respectively.
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foreign investors thanwhen they are acquired by domestic investors.
We take our analysis a step further and investigate whether the
development level of the country of origin of acquiring ﬁrms has an
impact on our ﬁndings. To do that, we focus on acquisitions from
high-income OECD countries,24 which, as shown in Table 2,
constitute the majority of foreign acquisitions in our sample.25
Speciﬁcally, we perform the same propensity score matching
methodology as before, but we now assume that only ﬁrms
acquired by investors originating from high-income OECD
countries receive the treatment. The corresponding results,
presented in Table 8, are very similar to those reported in Table 6
for the full sample of foreign acquirers, in terms of sign and
statistical signiﬁcance. Qualitatively though, the effects are now
relatively stronger, suggesting that the impact of foreign acquisi-
tion on debt reduction of target ﬁrms in Italy and Spain is actually
less pronounced when the acquiring ﬁrms originate from low-
income, developing countries.24 Following the World Bank’s deﬁnition of high income OECD countries, we
include the following countries in this category: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy (only in the case of Spanish targets), Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain
(only in the case of Italian targets), Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
25 Note that we are not able to perform a separate matching procedure for each
individual foreign nationality, as we have very few acquisitions in each case.4.3. Robustness tests
We perform a number of tests to assess the robustness of the
above ﬁndings (results available upon request).
First, we implement changes to the propensity score equation,
such as adding proﬁtability ratios, cash ﬂow to turnover ratios, and
square terms of scale and age among the regressors. Second, we
consider alternative matching methodologies, including the one-to-
one nearest neighbor matching and Epanechnikov kernel matching.
The results obtained from these tests provide evidence that supports
the ﬁndings of the previous section: foreign acquisition leads to a
signiﬁcant and steady reduction in ‘Gearing’ and ‘LeverageST’,
whereas domestic acquisition is associated with smaller and
statistically less robust (or of the opposite direction) effects.
Third, we check whether the observed differences between
foreign acquired, domestically acquired and non-acquired ﬁrms
are uniquely associated with the crisis and post-crisis years. To
investigate this issue, we restrict the sample to include the pre-
2008 period and carry out the same analysis as before. Despite the
obvious comparability problems with this approach (due to the
smaller number of matched targets), the matching estimates forPanel (b): Foreign acquisition from high-income OECD countries/LeverageST
Year Italy Spain
ATT N ATT N
0 1.266*** (0.450) 126 0.483 (0.322) 140
1 1.952*** (0.489) 105 1.379*** (0.357) 121
2 2.299*** (0.600) 85 1.959*** (0.464) 84
3 1.849*** (0.697) 67 2.065*** (0.495) 58
Note: ﬁve-nearest neighbor matching. ATT denotes average treatment effect on the
treated. N denotes the number of matched targets. Bootstrap standard errors in
parenthesis. ***,**,* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence level,
respectively.
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and lead to the same inferences. This suggests that the reported
debt effects of foreign acquisitions in Italy and Spain are not driven
by the fact that the acquiring ﬁrms are originating from countries
that were less severely affected by the crisis.
5. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the role of foreign versus domestic
ownership in reducing the debt levels of acquired (target) ﬁrms in
Italy and Spain. The empirical literature has been predominately
concentrated on the post-acquisition performance relationship of
acquiring ﬁrms, while measuring performance mainly in produc-
tivity and proﬁtability terms (Li et al., 2015; Markides & Ittner,
1994; Ning et al., 2014). In addition, the majority of past research
has concentrated on the performance of the acquirer, despite
signiﬁcant differences being identiﬁed between the two groups
(Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Our study contributes to this body of
literature in key distinct ways.
First, we provide clear evidence of the impact of foreign and
domestic acquisitions on debt levels of the target ﬁrms and offer an
appreciation of how the change in ownership affects the counter-
party instead. In order to estimate the causal impact of ownership
changes, we control for selection bias by applying propensity score
matching techniques. The results conﬁrm our expectations that a
change from domestic to foreign ownership leads to a lower reliance
on short and long term debt. In fact, our ﬁndings show a steady
reduction in the gearing and short-term leverage ratios for both
Italian andSpanish ﬁrms. The reductionindebt isnot associatedwith
a change of ownership per se, but only when the ownership is
transferred to foreign investors. As such, an acquisition by domestic
investors offers no signiﬁcant reduction in debt. Interestingly, in the
case of Spain, our ﬁndings suggest a contrary effect, with domestic
acquisition actually resulting in an increase of the short-term
leverage ratio of target ﬁrms and a potential deterioration of a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial health and survival chances.
The above ﬁndings offer strong support to both our hypotheses
(H1 and H2), denoting the distinct effect of foreign ownership on
debt reduction. We can see that foreign ownership not only yields
higher proﬁtability and productivity for the target ﬁrms (i.e. Arnold
& Javorcik, 2009; Hijzen, Martins, Schank, & Upward, 2013), but can
further act as a deterrent against debt over-exposure, leading as
such to more ﬁnancially healthy target ﬁrms. The proponents of
the ‘agency’ and ‘stakeholder’ theories have long supported that
the presence of foreign investors has the power to enhance
managerial control (Heugens et al., 2009), minimize managerial
opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and increase overall
shareholder protection against the risk associated to high leverage
(Grossman & Hart, 1982; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). We offer
strong support to the above.
Second, we examine measures of long- and short-term debt,
which have never been explicitly examined in the past, to further
augment our understanding regarding the overall impact of a
change in ownership. We ﬁnd that foreign ownership reduces
signiﬁcantly both gearing and short-term leverage ratios in both
countries. Acknowledging the important role of banks in Italy and
Spain, this ﬁnding comes to validate Desai et al. (2004), who argue
that parent companies would be inclined to reduce external
inﬂuences on their afﬁliates when faced with highly regulated and
uncertain institutions. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that the reduction in
the short-term leverage is much larger in total. This might be
further explained by the predominance of smaller-sized compa-
nies within the two examined countries. Titman and Wessels
(1988) have long suggested that smaller sized companies use
signiﬁcantly more short-term debt to ﬁnance their operations.
Therefore, it could be expected foreign acquirers  out of prudency to reduce the target’s short-term over-exposure, minimizing as
such the associated default risks and their overall external control.
Third, and while the acquisition literature has mainly concen-
trated on post-acquisition performance from the acquirer’s point of
view, the evidence suggests that the performance effects for the
acquirer and the target companies are not the same (Datta,
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Haleblian et al., 2009; Shleifer &
Vishny, 2003). In this study, we concentrate on the impact that
foreign ownership has on target ﬁrms and offer new insights on the
impact of a takeover deal for these companies. After all, the success
of an acquisition deal is often accredited to the integration and
strategic ﬁt between the acquirer and the target company
(Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Child, Faulkner,
& Pitkethly, 2000). Since a foreign acquisition is typically followed
by signiﬁcant operational and managerial changes to the target
company (Child et al., 2000), it is imperative to gain a better
understanding of the implications of these changes for the
company. Our study clearly shows that foreign ownership is
positively impacting on the capital structure of target companies,
reducing as such their overall risk proﬁle that can potentially
strengthen their survival (Beaver, 1966).
Some further interesting ﬁndings obtained from our analysis
relate to certain ﬁrm characteristics of the target companies. For
instance, our analysis has showed  in line with past research 
that larger and younger ﬁrms are more likely to be acquired,
especially in less efﬁcient markets and particularly from foreign
investors. Apparently, these companies are seen as more reliable
investments by foreign investors who tend to be rather ‘prudent’ in
their choices (Abdioglu, Bamiatzi, Cavusgil, Khurshed, & Statho-
poulos, 2015).
Finally, the above ﬁndings have important policy implications
that may contradict the old conservative European agendas in
encouraging the emergence of “national champions” (Monti, 2006;
Soares, 2008). It is clearly showcased here that foreign acquisitions
can beneﬁt signiﬁcantly acquired (domestic) ﬁrms, offering
consequently important overall contributions to the domestic
economy in which they operate. Taxation and ﬁnancial beneﬁts,
but also spillover effects, sharing new competencies, resources and
developing stronger networking alliances with the domestic
market (Haskel et al., 2007; O’Donnell & Blumentritt, 1999) are
only some of the associated beneﬁts. Therefore, foreign investment
opportunities should be welcomed and supported by national
governments, especially in the less-efﬁcient bank-based econo-
mies. Implementing policies aimed at attracting foreign invest-
ment can also be particularly beneﬁcial for countries like Italy and
Spain, which are characterized by underdeveloped private equity
markets and an overwhelming large share of SMEs, and thus
overreliance on bank credit and restricted ﬁnancing availability for
domestic ﬁrms.
6. Limitations and future research
As outlined in the previous section, our study offers important
and novel contributions to the foreign ownership  debt
relationship. However, it also has some limitations, which can
be used as the starting point for future research work in this area.
First, while we can identify the nationality of all acquiring ﬁrms, we
are able to collect data on other characteristics (such as size, age
and ﬁnancial performance) only for a sub-sample of these ﬁrms.
Our analysis thus cannot explain whether the observed acquisition
effects vary systematically across targets acquired by different
types of acquiring ﬁrms (e.g. large business groups versus small
ﬁrms).
Second, due to data availability and the complexity of the
research design, our study focuses only on two economies.
Extending the sample to include more countries could enable
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foreign acquisitions and debt reduction is actually a universal
phenomenon, and to explore the conditionality of effects upon
host country characteristics, such as the level of ﬁnancial
development and the type of ﬁnancial system. Likewise, by
constructing a multi-national panel dataset and employing a large
number of propensity score matched cases, one could investigate
which industries can beneﬁt the most from foreign acquisitions, in
terms of changes in their capital structure.Table A1
Distribution of ﬁrms by industry.
Manufacture of food products 
Manufacture of beverages 
Manufacture of tobacco products 
Manufacture of textiles 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 
Manufacture of leather and related products 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood 
except furniture
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Manufacture of coke and reﬁned petroleum products 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Manufacture of basic metals 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Manufacture of furniture 
Other manufacturing 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Land transport and transport via pipelines 
Water transport 
Air transport 
Warehousing and support activities for transportation 
Postal and courier activities 
Accommodation 
Food and beverage service activities 
Publishing activities 
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and mus
activities
Programming and broadcasting activities 
Telecommunications 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 
Information service activities 
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 
Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial services and insurance activities 
Real estate activities 
Legal and accounting activities 
Activities of head ofﬁces; management consultancy activities 
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 
Scientiﬁc research and development 
Advertising and market research 
Other professional, scientiﬁc and technical activities 
Veterinary activities 
Rental and leasing activities 
Appendix A.
See Tables A1–A3 .Finally, and while we offer several compelling explanations for
the motivations behind the reduction in debt levels of the foreign
target companies, the scope and structure of the current study do
not allow us to explore in more detail the motivations of such a
behavior, prioritize among them and/or uncover missing links. A
future research based on personal interviews with the decision-
makers could offer invaluable insights to our understanding of
their motivations, as well as the role that speciﬁc managerial
characteristics play for their decisions after each acquisition deal.Italy Spain
Number of
Observations
% of
total
Number of
Observations
% of total
34605 2.79 42246 3.39
5742 0.46 8964 0.72
144 0.01 108 0.01
22068 1.78 10125 0.81
22545 1.82 8271 0.66
17568 1.42 7812 0.63
13977 1.13 13590 1.09
10818 0.87 6174 0.50
13554 1.09 14364 1.15
1683 0.14 234 0.02
17532 1.41 13023 1.05
3411 0.27 2448 0.20
25929 2.09 15246 1.22
30726 2.48 24939 2.00
12132 0.98 7254 0.58
91026 7.34 50094 4.02
17334 1.40 4797 0.38
22023 1.77 7731 0.62
62505 5.04 20628 1.66
8208 0.66 6840 0.55
6759 0.54 2484 0.20
22050 1.78 13896 1.12
13968 1.13 5679 0.46
8613 0.69 7182 0.58
58365 4.70 56358 4.52
246204 19.84 282159 22.64
111501 8.99 118206 9.49
35532 2.86 50517 4.05
1710 0.14 1755 0.14
594 0.05 936 0.08
24444 1.97 26640 2.14
540 0.04 1836 0.15
25173 2.03 33561 2.69
19710 1.59 37737 3.03
7488 0.60 7065 0.57
ic publishing 4410 0.36 5391 0.43
2763 0.22 2574 0.21
2511 0.20 4977 0.40
23481 1.89 16632 1.33
9243 0.74 2142 0.17
5346 0.43 11421 0.92
5535 0.45 6336 0.51
54576 4.40 120087 9.64
5922 0.48 16830 1.35
20295 1.64 21735 1.74
15606 1.26 22617 1.81
3060 0.25 1845 0.15
12546 1.01 15462 1.24
7722 0.62 13518 1.08
81 0.01 495 0.04
6813 0.55 13284 1.07
Table A1 (Continued)
Italy Spain
Number of
Observations
% of
total
Number of
Observations
% of total
Employment activities 1044 0.08 3303 0.27
Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation 10224 0.82 7929 0.64
service and related activities
Security and investigation activities 3222 0.26 4014 0.32
Services to buildings and landscape activities 7623 0.61 19116 1.53
Ofﬁce administrative, ofﬁce support and other business support activities 14832 1.20 12213 0.98
Repair of computers and personal and household goods 3150 0.25 2088 0.17
Other personal service activities 4779 0.39 11250 0.90
Table A3
Balancing tests for matched sample.
Italy Spain
Mean t-test Mean t-test
Sample Treated Control |t| p > |t| Treated Control |t| p > |t|
Foreign acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.775 12.708 0.57 0.567 12.254 12.231 0.19 0.848
Gearing ln(Scale) 3.933 3.796 0.93 0.351 4.098 3.997 0.71 0.480
ln(Age) 2.710 2.713 0.03 0.980 2.832 2.759 0.73 0.467
ln(K/L) 3.050 3.231 0.92 0.360 2.754 2.648 0.51 0.610
ln(Gearing) 4.352 4.534 1.12 0.266 2.294 2.804 1.21 0.226
ln(Gearing)2 20.782 22.351 1.14 0.253 21.641 18.654 1.30 0.194
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.760 12.685 0.63 0.532 12.282 12.270 0.09 0.926
ln(Scale) 3.929 3.791 0.93 0.355 4.134 4.013 0.80 0.423
ln(Age) 2.686 2.725 0.29 0.771 2.864 2.749 0.99 0.322
ln(K/L) 2.994 3.195 0.96 0.339 2.798 2.760 0.17 0.866
ln(Gearing) 4.298 4.504 1.19 0.237 2.282 2.732 0.94 0.346
ln(Gearing)2 20.375 22.075 1.17 0.242 23.308 19.832 1.35 0.179
Domestic acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.466 12.390 0.81 0.416 11.984 11.998 0.14 0.888
Gearing ln(Scale) 3.913 3.821 0.69 0.491 3.641 3.584 0.57 0.567
ln(Age) 2.663 2.695 0.33 0.745 2.603 2.585 0.18 0.854
ln(K/L) 2.863 2.938 0.43 0.670 3.110 3.167 0.40 0.690
ln(Gearing) 4.565 4.600 0.27 0.784 2.933 2.616 1.07 0.285
ln(Gearing)2 22.548 22.815 0.25 0.805 22.055 21.739 0.19 0.846
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.462 12.415 0.48 0.632 11.958 11.980 0.20 0.844
ln(Scale) 3.927 3.816 0.81 0.420 3.655 3.605 0.49 0.621
ln(Age) 2.702 2.754 0.53 0.595 2.599 2.574 0.23 0.815
ln(K/L) 2.881 2.981 0.54 0.591 3.165 3.165 0.00 0.999
ln(Gearing) 4.558 4.570 0.09 0.927 2.785 2.629 0.49 0.627
ln(Gearing)2 22.447 22.569 0.11 0.915 22.074 21.473 0.34 0.732
Foreign acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.809 12.708 0.89 0.376 12.206 12.185 0.18 0.855
LeverageST ln(Scale) 3.907 3.771 0.95 0.341 4.138 4.012 0.94 0.346
ln(Age) 2.653 2.640 0.10 0.924 2.792 2.715 0.81 0.418
ln(K/L) 3.070 3.265 1.00 0.316 2.721 2.633 0.41 0.683
ln(LeverageST) 0.488 0.671 0.31 0.758 2.368 2.760 0.63 0.527
ln(LeverageST)2 24.787 27.779 0.79 0.431 37.409 39.933 0.60 0.547
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.789 12.665 0.99 0.322 12.245 12.233 0.10 0.918
ln(Scale) 3.987 3.852 0.90 0.371 4.123 4.018 0.74 0.463
ln(Age) 2.640 2.581 0.36 0.720 2.820 2.684 1.31 0.190
ln(K/L) 3.032 3.272 1.12 0.265 2.790 2.665 0.55 0.585
ln(LeverageST) 0.635 0.773 0.21 0.836 2.733 3.133 0.59 0.559
ln(LeverageST)2 25.733 28.857 0.74 0.461 38.989 42.629 0.78 0.435
Table A2
Distribution of ﬁrms by size class.
Italy Spain
Number of Observations % of total Number of Observations % of total
Less than 10 516618 42.80 485586 39.70
Between 10 and 19 315603 26.15 309168 25.28
Between 20 and 49 228447 18.93 292446 23.91
Between 50 and 249 125532 10.40 115155 9.42
250 and more 20790 1.72 20664 1.69
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Table A3 (Continued)
Italy Spain
Mean t-test Mean t-test
Sample Treated Control |t| p > |t| Treated Control |t| p > |t|
Domestic acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.453 12.363 0.98 0.327 11.964 11.959 0.05 0.958
LeverageST ln(Scale) 3.967 3.825 1.11 0.266 3.666 3.609 0.62 0.538
ln(Age) 2.663 2.663 0.00 0.999 2.515 2.482 0.32 0.749
ln(K/L) 2.804 2.961 0.96 0.339 3.022 2.993 0.22 0.826
ln(LeverageST) 0.123 0.629 1.06 0.289 3.230 3.578 0.85 0.396
ln(LeverageST)2 22.885 27.128 1.38 0.170 43.299 45.394 0.75 0.456
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.445 12.387 0.58 0.564 11.956 11.982 0.24 0.808
ln(Scale) 3.981 3.855 0.91 0.361 3.692 3.604 0.84 0.400
ln(Age) 2.670 2.680 0.09 0.925 2.442 2.474 0.27 0.790
ln(K/L) 2.776 2.992 1.23 0.219 3.053 3.007 0.31 0.754
ln(LeverageST) 0.291 0.557 0.50 0.619 3.859 4.092 0.50 0.618
ln(LeverageST)2 24.067 26.666 0.75 0.454 47.829 49.067 0.39 0.699
Note: The test examines the balancing hypothesis for all variables included in the propensity score, based on their pre-acquisition values. Year 0 refers to the sample of
matched targets included in the calculation of the ATT in the year of acquisition, whereas Year 1 refers to the sample of matched targets included in the calculations of the ATT
in the ﬁrst year following the acquisition.
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